

**A Woman's Totalerscheinung and Constant Becoming:
Salomé's Metaphysical Account of Woman's Inner Form and Dual Account of Freedom**

“Wenn allmählich mehr Licht geworden ist, wenn es sich heller konzentriert hat und in seinem Schein strenger zu arbeiten gestattet, dann wird vielleicht auch in manchen Punkten das Weib selbst, als Geschlechtswesen, erst in seiner ganzen Totalerscheinung klar werden.”

“When there has gradually grown more light, when it has become more brightly concentrated and allows for more rigorous work in its glow, then perhaps it is possible that in certain points Woman herself, as sexual being, will only become clear in her entire appearance of totality.”¹

Lou Andreas-Salomé wrote countless texts of various forms about the female way of life. She lived an unconventional lifestyle for the time—attended university and was uninterested in marriage and family despite marrying—and likewise maintained unconventional views on Woman and womanhood. She was not interested in campaigning for women's rights or becoming heavily involved in the political sphere. Rather, she was deeply invested in understanding Woman's psychology and biology, the way she forms and maintains a self, as well as how her biology and social expectations impact (and change) this self. The literature surrounding Salomé and these views take up the challenge of providing rigorous accounts of Woman in terms of her psychology, sexuality, biology, metaphysical nature, as well as her relation to art and religion. Missing from this conversation is how Salomé's Woman becomes emancipated: the kind of freedoms that come with her internal and external pursuits. My aim in this paper is to begin closing this gap: to understand what is required for the emancipation of a self (in the first instance) and an individualized Woman (in the second instance). Though Salomé steadfastly saw herself as operating outside of anything directly political—as in, she did not concern herself with rights—I suggest that a deeper discussion of her ‘self’ and ‘Woman’ reveals an account of internal and external freedom that flourishing, gendered persons require. Or, we can view the issue at hand slightly differently: without the appropriate account of freedom, her metaphysical account of gender is incomplete. What it takes for a woman to be emancipated under Salomé's picture tells us more about how genders are social statuses within a hierarchical social structure rather than mere biological categories.

I will draw on two main texts in pursuit of this end: *Der Mensch als Weib* and *Ma; Ein Porträt*². The former is a text philosophical in nature; Salomé argues for the ontological difference between man and woman in terms of their respective ways of life and distinguishes three different levels—the physiological, the psychological, and the mental. She delineates a

¹ Salomé, Lou Andreas-. “Der Mensch als Weib.” In *Aufsätze und Essays*, vol. 2, edited by Hans-Rüdiger Schwab, 95-130. Taching am See: MedienEdition Welsch, 2010, henceforth DMW.

² Salomé, Lou Andreas-. *Ma. Ein Porträt*, Stuttgart: Cotta 1901

female way of life. To my mind, *Ma* is a fictional instantiation of this text³. The novel follows the journey of Marianne—affectionately nicknamed ‘Ma’—as her youngest daughter, Sophie, decides to move abroad after finishing high school. The reader follows Cita (the oldest daughter), Dr. Tomasow (Marianne’s therapist), and Aunt Otilie (Marianne’s sister) through a few emotional Christmas days. Each character ponders motherhood, womanhood, marriage, family, and more as Sophie comes to her decision and shares it with her family. By the end, Marianne transforms from a woman dependent on a man and family relations into a self-sufficient Woman who chooses to be a mother and can confidently reject a marriage proposal. Insofar as we observe Salomé’s fictional concepts play out in the real world (that obtains in *Ma*), as it were, we can thus gain a greater understanding of the freedom she argues for. In fact, I suggest that characterization as it obtains in *Ma* is an instantiation of her metaphysics of gender; without an analysis of characterization, we cannot develop an account of Salomé’s notion of freedom. Thus, I will use Marianne as our case study. We can observe Salomé’s thoughts on Woman, the ideal Woman, and her opinions on stereotypes obtain given that Marianne initially appears as a woman embodying misogynist stereotypes and ultimately emerges as a very different woman.

I begin by providing the historical, thematic, and political context within which these works were published (Section One); I discuss what Salomé agrees with, what she resists, in what ways she was misunderstood, and what kind of project (i.e. political or not) she sees herself undertaking. Subsequently, in Section Two, I delineate what, according to Salomé, a Woman is both biologically and socially. This, in turn, provides the language of ‘internal’ and ‘external.’ This, too, reveals the various dialectics a Woman must handle: (a) Urgrund and Woman’s inner, whole home; (b) Woman as self-sufficient and dependent; and (c) Woman as providing her own home and providing a home for others. In Section Three, I then approach the topics of dependency and embodiment: Salomé’s Woman requires freedom given various external and internal relations involving dependency. Finally, in Section Four, I provide a rigorous account of Woman’s inner form as well as the internal and external freedoms it requires such that Woman can maintain the three pairs of contradictions. In Section Five, I suggest that this emancipation, in turn, reveals a positive affirmation of life despite Woman’s subjugation and oppression. Altogether, my aim is not to stabilize dualities, resolve tensions, or reduce dialects. Rather, I aim to offer a rigorous and thorough account of how these dualities, tensions, and dialectics make up who Woman is and what her freedom consists of on Salomé’s picture. The first section is a strictly historical account. The second involves both historical anecdotes, rigorous philosophical theory she puts forth, and literary analysis that culminates in her metaphysical account of gender.

³ While it is a fictional instantiation of the philosophical theories Salomé develops in *Der Mensch als Weib*, it is not meant to be merely instrumental: the literary work provides with just as much philosophy as the strictly philosophical work. In fact, it may provide us with something greater than what each text provides on its own precisely because of how the two texts are related to one another. Given that the two texts are different in nature—one is strictly philosophical while the other is a fictional text—my analyses will also look different. As one can imagine, the literary will require more work: the form needs just as much analyzing as the content. This is simply too much to achieve within one paper. Thus, I will at times take certain elements of the novel for granted, though we might argue that I need more work arrive at my claim. This work has been done in a different paper of mine (contact author for more information).

The third section details an argument I propose is necessitated by this account of gender: embodiment and dependency are topics Salomé evidently cannot avoid, and in fact has at the core of her account. The fourth section then takes what was developed in the first three sections and explicitly formalizes an account of freedom that was only ever implicit in Salomé's writings. Finally, the fifth section makes a move from the metaphysical to the normative: Salomé tells us not only what the nature of Woman is, but what we ought to afford Woman (in terms of freedom) in the face of certain biological truths and misunderstandings.

In Section Two, I argue that Salomé sees Woman as a constant negotiation between two opposing forces: between, on the one hand, self-sufficiency and her own home (which corresponds to the internal) and, on the other hand, a mother/wife and who necessitates a connection to the *Urgrund* (which corresponds to immediate external and all-encompassing external). In this way, Salomé offers a diagnosis of Man: he might triumph in terms of Right, but he suffers personally. In Section Three, I argue that according to Salomé, right—the political sphere—fails to capture dependency relations, which involve relations of caring that are not capturable by autonomous choosing. For Salomé, what it means to critique the condition of Woman is to take seriously issues of embodiment and dependency relations; a political critique of institutions such as marriage must involve a critique and reworking of embodiment and dependency. Finally, this culminates in my central proposal. The characterization of Marianne and how it relates to central claims in *Der Mensch als Weib* reveal that a Woman's inner form—the “inner being of woman”⁴—is both an (1) internal logic (a process of contradictions and resolutions, leading to a higher synthesis) and (2) *a priori* structure that shapes experiences. This requires inner freedom: a Woman's capacity to view herself as (and operate within external relations as) a subject and her capacity for engaging with reciprocal and reflexive relations within herself that, in turn, enables her to act in an autonomous and self-sufficient manner. Inner freedom creates a state of liberation wherein she can negotiate various dialectics independent from domination or coercion by others. External freedom, then, is Woman's ability to act within external relations—motherhood or marriage, for instance—in ways that are free from compulsion by others. It protects her inner freedom and creates her ability to externalize her inner form, thereby achieving wholeness and unity within herself and with an external context. Ultimately, inner form and internal freedom positively affirm life in the face of constant negotiation, suffering, and confusion that the necessity of external freedom implies.

⁴ DMW 114

1. Historical Context

1.1 Feminist Movements in Germany 1890s-1910s⁵

The German women's movement began in an organized form in October 1865 with the founding of the General German Women's Association in Leipzig. Fast forward to 1894 when the "Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine" (BDF), a federation of 34 women's associations, was founded. Fast forward again to 1898, when the women's movement split into the radical and moderate wings, with the issue of prostitution being the triggering factor. The General Assembly of the BDF in 1898 marked the end of the dominance of the anti-reform "Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein." The "Verband Fortschrittlicher Frauenvereine" was then founded in 1900 with the intention of being able to concentrate more intensively on the acquisition of women's rights. Serious differences between the two groups—moderates and radicals—continued to exist. Radicals were seen as pacifist nationalists who desired a connection with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and made frequent comments on politics. Moderates/Conservatives engaged in nationalism, avoided a connection with the SPD, and their political comments maintained neutrality. Only occasionally and on the local level did SPD and BDF women work together before 1914, mainly in municipal welfare activities. Later, radical leaders such as Minna Cauer, Helene Stöcker, Anita Augspurg, Lida Gustava Heymann, Marie Stritt and Anna Pappritz ensured voting and party integration through their dual membership movements with each other. This was despite the fact that the participation of women in political gatherings of any kind was illegal until 1908. In short, and perhaps as expected, there were two dominant strands of thought, various organized parties, and the feminist engagement was primarily in the political sphere in terms of Right.

1.2 Salomé's Stance on the Political Movements

In Salomé's view, the views of various feminist thinkers were critically misguided. In advocating for equal rights with men, Salomé saw the rationalists as inappropriately eradicating difference. In advocating for Woman as synonymous with motherhood, she saw the romantics as artificially limiting Woman. Both place a woman's subjectivity in man or make her subjectivity dependent on man: Salomé will want her subjectivity to be within her and identifiable through reciprocal relations in herself. Salomé encountered several of the women leading the various movements. As she notes in "Lebensrückblick⁶," she did attend certain gatherings and correspond with various women. She became particularly close with Frieda von Bülow, as her diaries and memoirs reveal, exchanging countless letters over the years. Likewise, she corresponded with Ellen Key, visited Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach and Kathe Kollwitz, and idolized Malwida von Meysenbug. Salomé would go on to publish in Helene Lange's "Die Frau"

⁵ For greater detail, see Kreide, Caroline. *Lou Andreas-Salomé, Feministin oder Antifeministin? : eine Standortbestimmung zur wilhelminischen Frauenbewegung* / Caroline Kreide. New York: P. Lang, 1996.

⁶Salomé, Lou Andreas-. *Lebensrückblick. Grundriß einiger Lebenserinnerungen*. Edited by Ernst Pfeiffer. Zürich/Wiesbaden: Nihans und Insel, 1951.

and Helene Stöcker's "Die Neue Generation." Furthermore, in her diary, she mentions on two different occasions that she personally knew her biggest critic Hedwig Dohm; Salomé also recounts personal interactions with Rosa Mayreder, who was not convinced by Salomé's work either. There are other significant women who Salomé came into contact with, such as Marie Lang and Anita Augspurg⁷. Furthermore, Salomé's theories of femininity and eroticism certainly made their rounds amongst German feminists; these ideas were reviewed in literary journals, and several younger women sought her advice after reading her books. In other words, Salomé was involved in the scene of female philosophers and activists. She directly contributed to activism with her publications, even though she largely kept out of any direct political involvement or significant (leadership) roles within the movement.

There is certainly much to go around regarding what Salomé and these women were corresponding about. My aim is not to dissect these letters and relationships here. Rather, I aim to illustrate the context within which Salomé wrote *Ma*. Evidently, she was in contact with the various women's movements but not significantly involved by any means. She may have published a few texts and had close relationships with significant leaders of these movements, but she did not involve herself in the movements to the same extent that these other women did. In part, this is because Salomé's work did not neatly align with either side of the debate. One side was too closely tied to something biological, and the other side fought for emancipation in the wrong ways. One side accused her of tying womanhood to something essentially biological, and the other side considered her to be doing too little by way of women's emancipation from motherhood. Those in favor of granting women some purpose outside of the family did not find her account palatable. Those who wanted women to be entirely liberated from family were entirely unsatisfied with her account. Those who wanted political and social change over and against intimate or personal accounts of "woman" found her account to be too philosophical and not political enough. This goes without mentioning that Salomé did not possess much nationalism, which did not bode well with certain members of the women's movement. Salomé, that is, did not satisfy any of the leading feminist views in Germany or Russia. Regarding criticism of Salomé's works, one might want to consider Hedwig Dohm's commentary—the person who first comes to mind as a Salomé critic. As Nassar and Gjesdal note, Dohm "prefigures twentieth-century critiques of biological essentialism, including those developed by Simone de Beauvoir."⁸ Dohm criticized Salomé for focusing "more on women's psychology than on their rights and social status."⁹ She argues in "Reaktion in der Frauenbewegung" that Salomé's "Der Mensch als Weib" betrays the feminist cause¹⁰. In short, it was difficult for Salomé to find a spot in the women's movement where she was accepted, and which she accepted.

⁷ For more detailed account see Welsch Ursula and Wiesner Michaela, *Lou Andreas-Salomé. Vom 'Lebensurgrund' zur Psychoanalyse*, Munich 1988, 116-143.

⁸ Nassar, Dalia , and Kristin Gjesdal. *Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition*. 2021 pp. 122, henceforth WPGT.

⁹ WPGT 182

¹⁰Hedwig Dohm, "Reaktion in der Frauenbewegung," *Die Zukunft*, Nov. 18, 1899, 271-291

1.3 Feminist or Anti-Feminist? Contextualizing Salomé's Philosophy

It is clear that she was not considered a feminist in any popular sense during her career, and certainly not during the time *Ma* was written and published. Where the current debate on Salomé's status as a feminist or anti-feminist stand is a bit more difficult. Certain interpretations of *Der Mensch als Weib* sketch a clearly anti-emancipatory picture: Salomé's account is simply too biologically essentialist and writes in very misogynistically coded ways. Her most famous relationships were with men, and that seemingly only endorses this anti-feminist reading of her life and work. To my mind, this focus on the men in her life is a grave misunderstanding of the life she led: she rejected traditional marriage and the loss of autonomy that comes with marriage. As she wrote to Rilke on this topic, “[a]llmählich wurde ich selber verzerrt, zerquält, überangestrengt, ging nur noch automatisch, mechanisch neben Dir, konnte kein volle Wärme mehr dransetzen, gab die eigene Nervenkraft aus! [Gradually I myself became distorted, tortured, overstrained, only walked automatically, mechanically next to you, could no longer put full heat into it; my own nerve power gave out]!”¹¹. Being defined only in opposition to, in service of, or in relation to men was, in other words, quite the opposite of how Salomé wanted to and did live her life¹². Just as she refused to be confined to anything traditional, we will see that her work, too, refuses to confine Woman to anything particular or only essentially biological. My aim is, as such, similar to Martin's: “My purpose is to trace the critical potential, the effects, and the limits of Salomé's efforts to conceive and to enact positions other than oedipal ones, her efforts to imagine and to perform the oxymoron of feminine individuality, to imagine and to live a different passage between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern, the world of fantasy and the world of reality, dependence and independence, the irrational and the rational.”¹³

For current standards, Salomé does indeed maintain certain anti-woman views. But, for her time, I suggest that she tried emancipating women in ways that seemed doable to her: re-writing the system from the inside rather than trying to do away with the system entirely and rewrite womanhood from the outside. That is, Salomé approaches the topic of womanhood from within the present oppressive system. This methodology is one she frequently employs: as she writes in *The Erotic*: “you can tackle the problem of the erotic however you want, but you will always feel that you have done so very one-sidedly, especially if you tackle it by means of logic—that is, from the outside.”¹⁴ The same goes for Woman in *Ma* and *Der Mensch als Weib*. To my mind, what thinkers of her time and still now do not do justice to is precisely this method: dismissing her as anti-woman because she worked from within the system overlooks the

¹¹ Rainer Maria Rilke und Lou Andreas-Salome, *Briefwechsel*. ed. Ernst Pfeiffer, Zürich: Nihans, 1952. Page 42. The majority of the letters are from Lou, as many of Rilke's letters are either missing or have not been published.

¹² For a biography of her life, see Welsch and Wiesner, and for a brief account of how the question of “woman” became and was relevant in her life, see Bidy Martin's introduction. Welsch Ursula and Wiesner Michaela, *Lou Andreas-Salomé. Vom 'Lebensurgrund' zur Psychoanalyse*, Munich 1988.

Martin Bidy, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salome*, New York 1991

¹³ Martin Bidy, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salome*, New York 1991. Page 22

¹⁴ WGT 184

important aspects of her view, including the necessity for cultivating and maintaining a whole self. To many, Salomé appears to be perpetuating a stereotypical understanding of sex because she accepts the at-the-time-popular biological view of females in *Ma* and *Der Mensch als Weib*. On my view, I suggest that this is misguided insofar as she takes the biology and demonstrates how, if this picture needs to be true, it must still lead to the conclusion that women need freedom just as men do—that women are independent, self-sufficient, capable, and intelligent just as men are. She accepts the biology but does not allow it to lead her to the same misogynist claim that less differentiated is inferior¹⁵. Quite the opposite, Salomé maintains that this less developed and less differentiated biology reveals a Woman’s “most prominent purpose” and why she ought to have similar freedoms as man¹⁶.

I do acknowledge that Salomé’s thought faces (anti-feminist) problems that come with identifying gender with something essential: she defines “woman” by virtue of some biological-based distinction between the sexes. Still, she operates within a conceptual space that is not as black or white as many may have it.¹⁷ Indeed, she argues for the emancipation of Woman in a way accessible to those with a traditional or anti-feminist mindset despite the contradiction regarding feminist ideology that this biological perspective may raise. That her call for emancipation has in mind the notion that emancipating women would result in more women becoming wives and mothers might still be concerning. Still, Salomé proposes that being denied emancipation is to keep Woman artificially confined¹⁸.

¹⁵ Waithe offers the same opinion in Waithe, Mary Ellen (ed.). *A History of Women Philosophers* (Volumes 1–3), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing. 1987–1991. Page 74. For more on this, see Biddy Martin, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, New York 1991, and Brinker-Gabler, Gisela. *Image in Outline: Reading Lou Andreas-Salomé*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012.

¹⁶ DMW 96

¹⁷ Given that the nature of my undertaking is to develop Salomé’s account of womanhood and motherhood in terms of a dual sense of freedom as presented in *Ma*, it is certainly worth asking whether there is any development of her views: is this her starting point? Where does she go from here? What can we say about the psychoanalytical work that followed her publishing this text? It seems plausible to suggest that her views developed insofar as, at the beginning of her career, she was still writing in ways to not get in trouble with the patriarchy, as it were (for more, see the introduction to WPGT). Her views in her early text may not be as developed or as strongly opinionated because of her social position as a woman. Perhaps we should view the arguments from the start of her career with this in mind. Her later texts, on the other hand, are far more psychoanalytic in nature: paralleling this potential for a development in her views on womanhood is this development in written form. This only complicates the initial question of whether there is any development regarding the views at stake in ‘*Ma*’. Regarding the progression of these psychoanalytic views (and implicit discussion of internal and external freedom), see Biddy Martin, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, New York 1991. Indeed, there is more work to be done on this question.

¹⁸ As Salomé writes, “nothing is able to emancipate a woman so deeply and truly as the premonition that through some kind of limitedness in which one is artificially held, one is denied the way on which she could attain full and pious devotion and reverence towards life. She could find the point from which life and she herself celebrate their harmony flowing mysterious in one another. Many of the conflicts, under which women today suffer have in marriage as well as in society, as in the struggle for existence, this meaning; while it seems as though woman struggles out of the feminine instead of into the feminine” (DMW125). She argues that the freedom of Woman abolishes all limitations on her; we must think of Woman like “any organized band of thieves” leading a lawless life (DMW 118). This goes without mentioning that Salomé did not live a conventional life herself.

2. Salomé's Metaphysics of Gender

Our task in this section is to understand Salomé's metaphysics of gender: what the nature of Woman is. A key part of this relates to biological differences between the sexes. Thus, I begin by discussing what Salomé understood biologists to be mistaken about, namely that Man and Woman correspond to something internal and external biologically and therefore socially as well. I continue by proposing that she conceives of these internal and external "ideal types" differently. This culminates in her account of the nature of Woman and Man.

2.1 Misunderstanding a Woman's Biology

The biological inferiority of the female sex was a widely held belief in the 1890s and early 1900's—the decades when Salomé published *Ma* and *Der Mensch als Weib*. As Martin and Barbara Alpern Engel point out, this was already a controversial and widely debated topic when Salomé was a child¹⁹. A few key theories and thinkers—Darwinian evolution, the work of Geddes and Thomson, and the work of other prominent biologists and sociologists—maintained the view that the male and female sexes maintained developmental differences that were considered superior in males. Thinkers such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Ernst Haeckel discussed female development at length, arguing that Woman is less evolved and thus more suited for motherhood: engaging in activity outside of motherhood would reduce her energy and thus not allow her to succeed at her biologically given role as a mother. It was not until 1905 that people began to take the sex chromosomes more seriously, realize that this biological inferiority was unfounded, and thus began taking seriously views of womanhood that are not grounded in an essential view of sex.

There are a few ways in which Salomé thinks the average biologist misunderstood sex and gender. For one, being less developed does not mean that Woman is only "passively receiving, bearing, and giving birth."²⁰ The average biologist refuses to see that someone less differentiated is still "entirely self-sufficient and gives like man."²¹ Womanhood is an "independent world for themselves."²² As we will shortly see, Salomé demonstrates in *Ma* that this can obtain: Woman can be independent, fulfilled, and self-sufficient while also working

For more on this, see Bidy Martin, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, New York 1991, and Brinker-Gabler, Gisela. *Image in Outline: Reading Lou Andreas-Salomé*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012.

¹⁹ Engel, Barbara Alpern. *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Page 46. Bidy Martin, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, New York 1991 Page 16.

²⁰ DMW 102

²¹ DMW 102

²² DMW 102. Also consider "She must weave herself into thoughts that should become valuable to her, she must be able to experience them, must consolidate a warm world around them and herself - until these thoughts by no means appear as rings of a chain, but rather as round and complete in themselves, small images of eternity instead of contingent deductions" (DMW 112-113).

within the domestic sphere²³. Again, contrary to historically oppressive stereotypes, Salomé firmly believes that Woman is not complete when she depends on Man. While there is something about her that suits Woman for marriage and motherhood, this is not her only goal. As Salomé puts it, “Woman is still not sufficient in herself and even insofar has not yet become sufficiently woman—at least not so as she lives in the desire and aspiration for the best men of her time and in the aspiration of these men.”²⁴ Moreover, Woman is not merely a compliment to man: “it is pointless to argue over which of the two ways is more valuable, or which of the two ways requires more strenuous exertion. [...] Therefore, one should not construe these two worlds as mere halves of one another, as they are often mistaken to be.”²⁵

Women, on historically stereotypical pictures based on biology, are defined in terms of their relationships with men and their roles within the family and society. This emphasis on the internal refers to the way women have been associated with immanence, the private sphere, and the body, reinforcing traditional roles such as motherhood and domesticity. In opposition to this, manhood would be associated with transcendence, the external and public sphere. Men are traditionally seen as the “subject,” while women are the “object” in this gendered dichotomy. Men are associated with agency, freedom, and defining themselves through their actions in the external world, such as work, politics, and public life. Indeed, this is the situation that obtains in the first chapter of *Ma*: the women are tied to the domestic sphere while the men make money and are independent. Over the course of the novel, however, Salomé goes on to show exactly why this is a problematic picture—why this entirely misunderstands ‘internal’ and ‘external.’

2.2 Re-writing traditional views of ‘internal’ and ‘external’

Understanding precisely what Salomé means by ‘internal’ and ‘external’ will show that she does not maintain traditionally oppressive views of Woman. It, too, will set us up to understand how Salomé conceives of a Woman’s freedom. In *Ma*, she presents us with two opposing female characters: Marianne and Aunt Otilie. Their dynamic reflects contrasting views on womanhood, motherhood, and independence. I suggest that a careful look at their characterization—the ways in which the two characters differ at the start of the novel, the way they change, and how similar they are by the end—reveals that freedom in womanhood lies in finding a balance between independence and connection, challenging conventional expectations, and embracing personal growth beyond predefined roles.

Marianne, initially portrayed as someone dependent on others, especially Dr. Tomasow, undergoes a transformative journey toward self-reliance whilst remaining proud of her motherhood. Aunt Otilie, on the other hand, criticizes Marianne for giving herself too completely to relationships—being too dependent—and argues for restraint and self-preservation. She advocates for holding back, expressing concern that complete self-sacrifice leads to deterioration. She emphasizes the importance of retaining something untouched and

²³ DMW 125-126

²⁴ DMW 114-115

²⁵ DMW 98

one's own. Marianne initially sees her purpose as raising her children and finding fulfillment in being a mother. This perception evolves as Marianne gains independence and finds fulfillment within herself by the end of the novel. Aunt Otilie's perspective on motherhood seems conflicted. While she acknowledges the enjoyable duties of being a mother, she also suggests that it is a tiring and taxing role. There remains a tension in her desire for independence and her acceptance of the responsibilities of motherhood. Marianne credits Dr. Tomasow for her success, portraying him as a hero who saved her. However, Dr. Tomasow's internal thoughts reveal a different relationship that she cannot or does not see; it, too, reveals that she was manipulated, not thinking for herself, and thus only knew dependence on man as a way to live. He initially helps her to be close to her but later envisions a different ending, possibly involving marriage. Aunt Otilie challenges Marianne's dependency on Dr. Tomasow. She questions why Ma speaks as if she owes everything to others when, in reality, she took her life into her own hands. Aunt Otilie criticizes the tendency to give too much credit to others, particularly men, and emphasizes the importance of self-reliance. Marianne's journey involves a shift from dependency on others to finding harmony within herself. Her ability to overcome challenges independently is highlighted, challenging the notion that she needed a man to guide her. In short, Ma first appears as a stereotypical Woman dependent on Man and oriented only toward family; she emerges as an empowered woman, free from the manipulation of man, who can be a mother and independent. Aunt Otilie first appears as a Woman against being dependent and therefore struggling with motherhood; she emerges having accepted that she can enjoy independence and being a mother.

As it turns out, both Marianne's and Aunt Otilie's perspectives converge in promoting the idea that women should have the freedom to exercise her sense of autonomy, self-preservation, retain her identity within the context of relationships. They both learn how to balance motherhood and independence and can only properly do so with the proper freedoms in place. With Marianne, Salomé demonstrates that Woman who is too dependent on Man and who finds purpose in raising a family will not be personally fulfilled or free, nor can she be a 'good' mother or wife when coerced to do so. With Aunt Otilie, Salomé demonstrates that a Woman not willing to enter dependent relationships will also struggle. As such, womanhood and freedom in womanhood lie in finding a balance between independence and connection, challenging conventional expectations, and embracing personal growth beyond predefined roles. Something internal and external must be satisfied.

This is to say that the 'internal' refers to a Woman's ability to be self-sufficient: it is a self-reflexive principle rather than something that refers to the domestic sphere. The external refers to external goals or roles, such as dependency and embodiment in marriage and motherhood, rather than the male-coded public sphere. For Salomé, to emphasize the internal when discussing Woman is to emphasize the fact that Woman must live more immediately connected with her body—she must maintain a relationship to herself not mediated by anything external. This, in turn, allows her to be not just defined in opposition to man or as another half²⁶, as Salomé warns against in *Der Mensch als Weib*. Woman figured this way becomes self-

²⁶ DMW 98

sufficient both in a definitional sense and in the sense that she needs only herself. Considering the external when discussing Woman is to consider that which she already does: engage in marriage, motherhood, and other such institutions. While these external relationships define a woman through her actions in the external world, they also limit her insofar as the stereotypical view of womanhood makes room only for these traditional roles. Salomé, however, wants to ascribe subjectivity, agency, and freedom to Woman, which will enable her to undertake these roles with said freedom²⁷ by ascribing what I call internal freedom and form to her: it is through this emphasis on the internal that she can view herself as a subject when engaging in external roles. In short, Salomé turns traditional understandings of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ on their head.

These directions—internal and external—manifest differently for Woman and Man²⁸. Salomé understands Woman as developing from within; they possess an inward focus, unlike Man who possess an outward-facing focus. Men, therefore, can be characterized as “mechanistic, almost automatic.”²⁹ The inward focus that the female possesses can be described as “homeland [Heimat]” or “being at home [heimisch sein],”³⁰ “harmony,”³¹ and “unity” or intrinsic “uniformity [Einheitlichkeit].”³² The direction for Man—external relations—is given: socially, they are designed to be in the public sphere and have external goals. The direction for Woman—internal relations—is also given in traditional pictures. They are just not given in the way that Salomé thinks they ought to be³³. She rewrites the internal for Woman to provide liberation, not limitation: in *Ma* and *Der Mensch als Weib*, that a woman is her own home and self-sufficient is liberating in general and with regard to being a mother and a wife insofar as it gives Woman choice and agency. Salomé also rewrites the external for man to show how it is limiting, not liberating. Consider the male characters in *Ma*: Marianne’s late husband passed away and was unable to be self-sufficient and whole, while Dr. Tomasow did not pass away but does not know how to enjoy life. It becomes clear that Tomasow was just as ‘broken’ as Marianne when he met her. Indeed, only in the presence of Marianne and her children does Dr. Tomasow rediscover the essential nature of life. This shows that Man’s external drive is quite limiting: it does not allow him to experience life to the fullest. He is so externally driven that he begins to know himself less internally. This challenges the notion that externally driven pursuits alone define a meaningful life—a (emotional) connection to the self remains critical.

On this note, I should mention that the internal and the external map onto the individual and the collective. Salomé understands Woman as developing from within; they possess an inward focus, unlike Man who possesses an outward-facing focus. The internal is, as such, something private. The external focus is connected to the public sphere; it involves relations to

²⁷ DMW 96-98, as well as the progression of *Ma*

²⁸ Salomé’s writes, “[t]he positive quality of her life is not as precisely perceivable in its internal effects, as are the externally-thrusting effects and achievements of man, which allow compelling conclusions to be drawn about their corresponding needs” (DMW 106)

²⁹ DMW, 104

³⁰ DMW 96, 97, 115-118, 128

³¹ DMW, 97, 115, 125, 128

³² DMW, 102, 104, 108, 119, 129

³³ DMW 96, 102, 112-113, 125-126, and the progression in *Ma*

others rather than to oneself. Man already maintains agency and freedom through the collective because he is the collective³⁴: he can afford to master only external relations because he is socially constructed and defined by them. Woman, however, must cultivate a relationship to herself not mediated by the collective to have this agency and freedom³⁵: she needs a strong sense of her individuality given its misunderstanding in the collective. Or, in Salomé's words, "no space for woman's development is therefore just as bad as no freedom of movement for man's development, because just as he wants to be allowed to stretch himself towards anything where his abilities aim and where they come to a head, so she must be allowed to grow and increase herself to continually greater scopes of being."³⁶ In figuring Woman this way, she makes accessible the conceptual and social possibility of a female self irreducible to the inappropriate and false alternatives—submitting to, being the complimentary half to, or imitating—of Man³⁷.

2.3 Defining Salomé's Account of Woman

Having made clear the traditional picture of sex (and the respective internal and external relations), as well as how Salomé intends to re-write this, I now briefly define how exactly she defines Woman³⁸. This, in turn, will allow us to understand what internal and external freedoms apply.

Woman must, according to Salomé, constantly reconcile and harmonize³⁹ three significant contradictions (among others): a) a desire to return to the Urgrund and a desire to be her own inner, whole home; (b) self-sufficient and dependent; and (c) providing her own home and providing a home for others. This much is true of Marianne in *Ma*. Marianne desires to be her own, whole home (as evidenced by her changing attitude towards Dr. Tomasow) and desires

³⁴ DMW 117-118

³⁵ DMW 117-119. "As paradoxical as it sounds, one can indeed say: The house, tradition, the barrier must be there much more for the man and must be given from the outside, precisely because he has his strength and productivity elsewhere and because he consumes them in the restless striving and struggle of all abilities towards externally lying goals-of-activity. For his rest, his composure, his joie de vivre, he must discover the longed-for, peaceful union complete there, where woman prevails. Just as how he can become completely brutalized without such a complement or become peaceless in deep insufficiency, so it is in reverse, necessary for woman to always continually incorporate light and air into herself, and to unfurl and blossom, so that she does not suffocate and humble herself in more constricted contentment" (DMW 117-119).

³⁶ DMW 118-119

³⁷ See Martin Bidy, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, New York 1991 page 2 for a slightly different account.

³⁸ My intention is not to offer a rigorous account of Woman in Salomé's work; I intend merely to give a rudimentary understanding necessary for us to understand where I get the language of internal and external freedom from, and what sorts of beings this freedom applies to.

For more rigorous accounts on defining gender in Salomé's works, see Bidy Martin, *Woman and Modernity. The (Life)styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, New York 1991; Brinker-Gabler, Gisela. *Image in Outline: Reading Lou Andreas-Salomé*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012; Cormican, Muriel, *Women in the works of Lou Andreas-Salomé. Negotiating Identity*, Rochester, NY 2009; Katrin Schütz, *Geschlechterentwürfe im literarischen Werk von Lou Andreas-Salomé unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Geschlechtertheorie*, Würzburg 2008.

³⁹ For more, see Kraus, Katharina Teresa, 'Lou Salomé (1861–1937)', in Kristin Gjesdal, and Dalia Nassar (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth-Century Women Philosophers in the German Tradition*, Oxford Handbooks 2024. Page 21

to be a part of the Urgrund (as evidenced by her moments of reflection on nature and life). She is self-sufficient (evidenced by her ability to turn down the proposal) and dependent (as evidenced by her relying on Sophie for joy). She becomes her own home while also providing a home to Sophie and Cita.

Regarding (a), Marianne's relationship with her late husband and her needs after his death reveals that she needs inner peace—the ability to be her own family and home—to find wholeness: she becomes Marianne, not just Ma. At first, she claims that all she needs is children and a family—they make her whole. As it turns out, however, Dr. Tomasow manipulated Marianne in such ways that she was left with this impression; only when she begins to think for herself does she realize that she actually can find purpose within herself rather than only in her children. Not only does she think she can, but it turns out she needs to find a home within herself: without that, she realizes she cannot be a 'good' mother to Sophie. That Ma goes from thinking that what she wants is family to realizing that she can experience more without sacrificing family suggests that Salomé privileges or argues for independence in womanhood: women can have a family and an identity that is not inextricably defined only by members of the family. Not only does Marianne realize—when given the chance to do so without Dr. Tomasow's comments—that she can and needs to be her own home, but she also desires a return to what is larger than her. In fact, what helps her recover from the loss of her husband is an extended stay in nature—a stay during which she could experience dissolving into everything. This dissolution of identity gave her the ability to rebuild her particularity beyond 'Ma.'

Salomé supports this reading of Woman in *Der Mensch als Weib*. She writes that womanhood is “unobjective, open-minded in personal being, and self-sufficient in her own world-of-being” and “should[...] take herself more objectively at the very least, and not so isolatedly, as it should be the for the case in man⁴⁰. For Salomé, Woman is not only less differentiated but also “the one who has an even more unmediated part in all life itself.”⁴¹ She “organically fits into the whole of life with, so to speak, a different gesture—with a broader and more devoted gesture than the man with his rebellion against everything that could hinder himself from specializing further and further.”⁴² This return to the Urgrund is quite important: being grounded in the Urgrund allows Woman to exist within a dependent and independent state.⁴³ At the same time, however, Salomé compares a woman to a

small snail that crawls, enjoying the way, while she carries her little house on her back. The little house is her own, but on the way, the various things that she needs and wants increases, in order to grow herself into a proper, vital snail. In this way, woman—often still not yet clearly conscious of herself— carries with her the feeling of being-at home and becoming-domestic at a time where the desire to acquire many things for herself drives her, which only later fully comes to her feminine values. Without knowing it

⁴⁰ DMW 122

⁴¹ DMW 122

⁴² DMW 122

⁴³ DMW 103-104

herself, she adorns, expands, enhances, and strengthens this home of her own being, in which others are expected to find their peace and quiet—therefore it is precisely she who can most carelessly overlook the applicable codes of conduct in her coincidental surroundings and existing barriers of the house. These same ones can at the easiest become too hollowed, superfluous husks and crusts, which she must strip off because she will someday produce the same herself out of living life.⁴⁴

Many things come to a head in this comparison. A part of a Woman's essence is to be her own home—to be self-sufficient and independent. The snail's slow crawl implies a deliberate and thoughtful progression through life. The little house represents the woman's internal being herself. The house is initially small, but as she goes through life, it accumulates various things she needs and wants, reflecting personal growth and experiences. As Woman desires to acquire things for herself, she simultaneously develops feminine values, implying a process of self-discovery and the evolution of her identity. Woman, perhaps unconsciously, adorns, expands, enhances, and strengthens her sense of self. She must, that is, return both to herself and to the Urgrund. Perhaps, considered in this way, particularity is the mediating principle between universality and individuality, where the universal is the infinite, the particular is the finite, and the individual is the locus of reconciliation. The universal—and Urgrund—is necessary as a starting point, and Woman particularizes a self into individuals out of universals. This allows her to overcome Woman as general and prescribed, while remaining situated within greater (dependency) structures.

That said, Ma's self-sufficiency, Cita's independence, and Aunt Ottilie's critique of both their characters emphasize that Woman needs to see herself as subject (this is what Ma learns) and needs to see this within (dependent) external relations (this is what Cita must learn). Woman must be self-sufficient while also dependent on others (b). She must live "more directly bound to her physique, and in her, one can point out more clearly than in him to the fact (which at the end of the day also applies to him) that all of spiritual life itself is ultimately just a converted, finely reshaped blossom from the great sexually determined root of all existence—sublimated sexuality, so to speak."⁴⁵ She must be more in touch with herself physically and emotionally—she must be self-sufficient. When Woman achieves this state, then she cannot lose sight of the Urgrund; when in touch with the Urgrund, she cannot lose her self-sufficiency. Figured this way, Woman needs a reciprocal relation to herself. A return to the Urgrund is crucial in navigating this objective and subjective self. And yet, she must also be dependent on others in familial relations. According to Salomé, Woman has "the most to give because even while giving herself, she asserts herself, and not out of poverty and lack, but rather out of wealth and abundance," and this, in turn, provides "a great concentration and tranquility of the soul."⁴⁶ Woman does strive for external relations, for in these relations, she can assert herself. This assertion of the self is an assertion of some kind of inner form. Combine this with a whole, self-sufficient self and with a

⁴⁴ DMW 116-117

⁴⁵ DMW 103

⁴⁶ DMW 126-127

whole collective/urgrund, and Woman can find peace in her soul. Along these lines, Woman is not only dependent on familial relations: she is also someone who provides a home—she provides care and is dependent upon (c).

In *Ma*, this understanding of Woman takes place on an internal and external level. Marianne begins to form a full self—and find freedom from Dr. Tomasow’s coercion—by turning inward. When she cannot go to Sophie, Cita, Aunt Otilie, or Dr. Tomasow for help, she is forcibly left with herself. In stretches of internal dialogue, it becomes clear that there is something internal to her being that only she can assert and care for. While, on an external level, she engages in lengthy dialogue with other characters, parsing out how she can, wants to, and needs to assert herself: understanding how she is directing her attention to them as an external end. This understanding of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is familiar to *Der Mensch als Weib* as well. Salomé considers the “inner being of woman,⁴⁷” a “feminine being,” “uniform to itself.”⁴⁸ She does not operate in isolation nor towards an external goal, and instead “organically grows together with what it created, it completes itself in what one can hardly call an activity because it consists only in that which issues from its uniform, vivid life, that in turn emanates from uniform, vivid life.”⁴⁹ In this way, Woman necessitates both something internal and external to realize herself and fully participate in external relations fully⁵⁰. She becomes fully self-sufficient—she becomes more than “the nourishing soil for the little double-embryo inside her” only when she comes whole: only, that is, when she becomes an “independent being, perfect in itself.”⁵¹ This is when “doing and being coincide in her until all individual acts are nothing more than the great involuntary act of being itself, and until woman ‘pays life with what she is, not with what she does.’⁵² This motivates the notion that Woman must have an inner form, an inner freedom through which to realize this form, and an external freedom that both creates her ability to realize her form and protects her ability to maintain this form.

Woman must also be in touch with her femininity and masculinity. Without will and strength—two “masculine” characteristics—she would not be complete in herself⁵³. As the proposal scene in *Ma* reveals, Woman engaging with her femininity and masculinity in free and complete ways untethers her from Man; it gives her the subjectivity to be an agent who makes choices of her own, for herself, and by herself. This, in turn, suggests that Man is always tethered to Woman (contra the traditional understanding of the sexes): he (and family) need her to be in such a state to make choices, for as Salomé emphasizes in *Ma* with the progression of

⁴⁷ DMW 114

⁴⁸ DMW 102-103

⁴⁹ DMW102-103

⁵⁰ Brinker-Gabler phrases this quite neatly, with an implicit mention of something internal and external: “Woman becomes a threshold, a mediator between past and future, between modern and pre-modern, a figure of contradiction, paradox and ambiguity [...] Woman is a paradoxical figure with the unique ability to sustain contradictions and ambiguities, and as such, lives in perpetual transition.” For more, see Brinker-Gabler, Gisela. *Image in Outline: Reading Lou Andreas-Salomé*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. Page 35.

⁵¹ DMW 102-103

⁵² DMW 102-103

⁵³ DMW 120-121, 128

Marianne's character and how her lack of clear choice threatens family wellbeing, the lack of choice for women is dangerous—it leads to families breaking apart⁵⁴. If she had the freedom to make choices without coercion or limitation, then she can choose to be a housewife within her emancipation; if she is forced to be a mother and wife, then she will not want to undertake this appropriately, and she will undertake behaviors harmful to the family. Consider our previous discussion on what it means for Woman to be emancipated: it is not to escape marriage and social expectations but for Woman to happily choose for herself to be a mother and wife (if she so chooses, which Salomé believes is likely⁵⁵).

2.4 Salomé's Diagnosis of Man and Masculinity

By defining Womanhood and femininity, Salomé also diagnoses Man and masculinity. The previously mentioned discussion of *Ma*—of Dr. Tomasow's failure and Ma's husband's death—certainly suggests as much. Unlike Woman, Man “in the struggle of development and the individual occupation, cannot do equal justice to all aspects of his being; his individuality consciousness must continue to exist not only in the general whole of his being, but also in his partial activities, [...] in order to come to enjoyment and security of his own self.⁵⁶” This suggests a negative picture of Man: he simply cannot achieve wholeness in the way Woman can: his consciousness is in his whole and his parts, yet he operates in parts. He must always exist in parts and cannot be equally in touch with his entire whole. A whole which, Salomé argues, provides for the highest form of living—the greatest unity and peace. Man is “like a tool in relation to that which he selflessly put above his personal advantage.⁵⁷” In these moments, he feels like an object (a tool). Other times, he is a complete or whole subject:

he too [in relation to Woman] stands in a mysterious consolidation of all things: And all things speak to him as if they speak to someone who has returned home, around whom there is nothing foreign anymore, and in whom there is no more specialized development and no specialized drive, but rather, a deep interaction of everything with everything, a deep unity from which alone all progress towards isolation extracts its strength, in order to return to itself once more.⁵⁸

Like when a woman is her own home, nothing is foreign, and everything is connected to some *Urgrund*, Man too might experience this “consolidation.” A deep unity arises—one that is self-reflexive and establishes the kind of wholeness Salomé sees Woman and Man as needing. This wholeness, however, is far more difficult for Man to achieve—difficult but not impossible⁵⁹. As she writes, Woman “can take on more contradictions and work through them, naturally,

⁵⁴ also in DMW 112-115

⁵⁵ As we see in *Ma*, Marianne does not choose marriage when free to a significant extent. Evidently, Salomé does not believe women obviously would choose marriage.

⁵⁶ DMW 12

⁵⁷ DMW 129-128

⁵⁸ DMW 129-130

⁵⁹ DMW 110: he is always missing something.

organically, within herself, whereas Man must first weed out these very contradictions theoretically before he can attain clarity in his own mind.”⁶⁰

This is because Salomé describes Man as dissatisfied, restless, compulsively, not returning to the Urgrund, necessarily searching for new goals, and resembling a “perpetually forwards-running line whose final destination no one knows.”⁶¹ She describes that this is related to his biology precisely because his small male cell means that it must always seek help for itself despite it being made for progress. The achievements of man are “externally thrusting”⁶². While this externality seems beneficial socially, it seems personally unfulfilling. This diagnosis reveals that Man’s constant search for an external object will be fruitless and, therefore, never-ending because he does not live with unity of the soul, mind, and body, as Woman does. Indeed, Dr. Tomasow and Marianne’s late husband are never satisfied, always moving, and never finding stable or constant results for their search. So, in fact, Woman has something that Man lost or perhaps has the social privilege of being able to ignore. Woman maintains “greater self-glory [Selbstherrlichkeit], as opposed to the isolated sense-instincts [which Men possess]: Greater freedom over everything that lies beyond herself.”⁶³

While on this topic of comparing Man and Woman in terms of their external and internal relations/states, I briefly demonstrate just how similar Dr. Tomasow and Marianne are: Salomé demonstrates that Man is constantly unsatisfied but can get away with this for reasons Woman cannot. Dr. Tomasow struggles with very similar things as Marianne does: he loses interest in life just as she does; he is very dependent on her (and she on him) for happiness and purpose; he wants to find his purpose in someone else in the way Marianne seeks it in her children; his occupation is to help others while hers is to help others by being a teacher; he is judged by those around him just as she is by her extending family; he struggles to share his emotions with anyone but Marianne and vice versa. And yet, in *Ma*, Marianne is the character who appears to be struggling or like the victim: Tomasow can hide in the shadows or beneath the facade of being a powerful man. The reader will not find themselves considering that he needs help in the way that they consider that Marianne needs help, even though he explicitly discusses his struggles. I suggest that the only explanation can be his gender: the social possibilities allow him to come out on top. He can, much more quickly, handle his single existence (as previously discussed), unlike Woman who must consider the coexistence of “doubly directional” drives. And yet, he is problematically not complete. As Salomé has it, “[t]here is the man, albeit the aggressive, enterprising part, only partially and momentary participates in the process— effectively through an individual act of himself, because he lives in a progressive division of all his powers, which diverge into many individual goals and activities: His worth is comprised of all that he achieves and develops.”⁶⁴ The emphasis is on this engagement through personal actions, suggesting that their contribution is limited in scope and duration. The notion that “his worth is comprised of all

⁶⁰ DMW 112

⁶¹ DMW 96

⁶² DMW 106-107. This, for instance, is where I get the language of internal and external from.

⁶³ DMW 105

⁶⁴ DMW 102

that he achieves and develops” underscores the idea that the value or significance of Man is determined by his accomplishments and personal growth. The assessment of an individual’s worth is tied to their actions and the outcomes they generate rather than just their inherent qualities.

This is why Man will appear to be doing better than Woman: he has the privilege of being assessed by his external relations, and thus the horror of never becoming whole and free. His freedom is an illusion, albeit one with positive, practical, social consequences. Indeed, Salomé confirms this when she writes that Man is “dissatisfied and searching for new goals, creating new work and, in short, driven by compulsion and necessity.⁶⁵” Here, agency, choice, and knowledge of the self and desires do not drive Man. Instead, it is his constant uncomfortable, dissatisfied, and therefore incomplete state. He is, theoretically, not better off than Woman: it is only because society sees more differentiated as better that he is socially better off. As we will shortly see, this demonstrates that the self—man or woman—always needs to engage with forces in both directions: this, in turn, should be protected by internal and external freedom. Each sex needs self-reverting and reconnection to be liberated, but under the traditional picture of sex, neither woman nor man truly finds this for their inner form. This is despite the fact that men live under—and can afford to live under—the illusion (and practical circumstances) that they have this liberation.

3. Gender Relations Necessitate an Account of Freedom; The Failure of Politics to Account for Dependency & Embodiment within Gender Relations

We’ve developed Salomé’s description of what Man and Woman are, picture of biology, how she redefines ‘internal’ and ‘external,’ the importance of the Urgrund, and home/wholeness. This, in turn, suggests what she takes the self to be. In this section, I aim to suggest that there is something about this account—dependency and embodiment—that requires certain freedom. Her account of “Woman” and “Man” is not complete, as it were, without an account of freedom that we will derive from her literary works. Again, this account is generally metaphysical: given that it is in a Woman’s nature to depend on others, be depended on, and be autonomous, certain freedoms must necessarily follow to protect this nature. It is a social fact that these freedoms do not follow from simply being a Woman, however, and thus I read Salomé as suggesting that Women should have these freedoms.

Other philosophers of the time preoccupied themselves with rights to others and to state; they preoccupied themselves with what rights the state has against a woman and in what ways they ought to protect her. Indeed, this can be traced back through the German Tradition, certainly when Kant introduced the importance of the rights one has against the state. Salomé, however, is concerned with the metaphysical status of Woman and her freedoms, not the political nor the ethical; according to her, the former is not given the correct kind of consideration in the feminist movement. Given dependency relations deeply connected to sex—given the setting ends for one another that occurs within those dependency relations— developed in *Der Mensch als Weib*, a

⁶⁵ DMW 96

proper metaphysical account of freedom and a free self is necessary (and developed in *Ma*). The dependent person—the woman—ought not to be solely in the power of man. According to Salomé, thinkers (such as Hedwig Dohm) observed the right problem—that Woman ought not to be dependent on Man—but did not attain the right solution by appealing only to right⁶⁶. Right—the political sphere—fails to capture dependency relations, which involve relations of caring that are not capturable by autonomous choosing. This is only emphasized by the fact that Marianne finds emancipation not because more rights were enacted but because she was able to realize her inner form and take her own freedoms more seriously. Indeed, I suggest that Marianne’s character development reveals Salomé is concerned with how the self can be free and protected such that she is an autonomous being within marriage and motherhood dependency relations.

That is, for Salomé, what it means to critique the condition of Woman is more than defining the biological, internal, and external dimension of a Woman’s nature: to critique Woman’s condition is to take seriously issues of embodiment and dependency relations. A political critique of institutions such as marriage must involve a critique and reworking of embodiment and dependency. A part of this is understanding caregivers and receivers within the familial institution—taking seriously what traditionally has been deemed “woman’s work.” We can think of ‘care’ as a concept she presents in *Der Mensch als Weib, Ma, Die Erotik*, and *Der Gott*. I derive this concept from her understanding of “home” and “homeliness” and is metaphysical in nature. For Salomé, given her lack of interests in Right, care is prior to and independent of justice. Some caregiving involves predetermined biological roles, as previously discussed. Other forms of caregiving involve the relations Woman has to herself and to the Urgrund such that she can act within those biologically determined caregiving roles in the appropriate manner. As it stands, however, care is ruled by the more differentiated sex cell that was mistakenly deemed stronger and more capable. But if Woman is authorized unilaterally to set ends on behalf of the care-receivers—family and Man—then, on my reading of Salomé, there must be external and internal freedoms creating and protecting a woman’s relation to herself and the Urgrund (derived from Marianne’s character development): when Marianne does not have her freedoms, she is unable to set ends for herself and Sophie. Otherwise, the dependency and asymmetry constitutive of care relations result in the subjection of the caregiver’s private life to the care receiver's choices⁶⁷.

Within these dependent relations are two persons who can do any of the following. They may pursue their separate ends separately (as Marianne and Aunt Otilie do), pursue them interdependently (as Marianne and Cita do), or set ends together (as Marianne and Sophie do). I take it that, for Salomé, given the metaphysical nature of gender, these various forms of end setting would require a rigorous understanding of internal freedom, external freedom, and inner form such that Woman is taken seriously and as an autonomous being during the end-setting

⁶⁶ Though, to my mind, describing a mechanism behind women’s subordination (the lack of freedoms) is a kind of political intervention.

⁶⁷ Varden discusses Kant and Care in similar terms, inspiring my reading of Salomé. Varden, Helga. A Kantian critique of the care tradition: Family law and systemic justice. *Kantian Review*, 17(2), 2012. 333

process. This freedom requires wholeness in terms of a connection to the Urgrund and oneself, as evidenced by each character's journey towards wholeness. There may be an intuitive appeal in the idea that appropriate relations of care require proper law and public authority that equally respects and considers all; the state's coercive institutions are the answer to allowing those within dependent relations to set ends adequately. Such institutions step in when there is harm and need to be revised, according to Dohm, to identify this harm properly. On my reading of Salomé, however, this intuition is misguided. For her, the consequence of this intuition is that law replaces a Woman's ability to be a complete self⁶⁸. This is all to motivate what it is that inspires Salomé to offer (and demonstrate in her fictional works) a metaphysical account of the self in terms of sex/gender, embodiment, and dependency (on others and oneself).

In the first instance, I suggest Salomé's claims are metaphysical claims about the way that freedom and sex interact. Given this, she implicitly makes the move that, if it is beneficial for Woman (and Man) to live with certain freedoms, then they should have those freedoms. Parsing out the normative claim, though, is not her aim. Parsing out how politics is meant to account for this metaphysical picture is not her aim either. One might wonder what her motivations are: what is the question she seeks to answer? I suggest that the most general question regards what it means to live a good and fulfilled life with individuality, given the societal structure of marriage and motherhood and differentiated sex biology. To argue for the emancipation of Woman, one must have a clear understanding of what, in the first place, it means to be free as a Woman. This presupposes an account of Woman, and an account of freedom, where the former informs the latter.

4. Salomé's Account of Inner Form and Freedom Derived from her Metaphysical Picture of Gender

Finally, we have arrived at where we have been going all along: formalizing Salomé's account of freedom. We began by setting the scene—understanding the historical context within which this account was conceived. Subsequently, I developed her metaphysical account of gender as she puts it forth in *Der Mensch als Weib* and demonstrates it in *Ma*. This has given us strong reasons to believe that, at the core of gender, are elements of dependency and embodiment that need protecting such that Woman can be emancipated while remaining a whole, autonomous yet dependent, self. Thus, in this section, I take on exactly what this emancipation entails.

4.1 Salomé's Account of Inner Form

We can locate a kind of inner form in the female characters in *Ma* and provide a more rigorous account of this given Salomé's thoughts in *Der Mensch als Weib*. In Marianne, Sophie, Cita, and Aunt Otilie, we can observe two things. Firstly, each character is constantly working through contradictions and resolutions; with each negotiation, they become slightly more whole. By the end of the novel, they maintain similar wholeness within each of themselves despite having gone through different situations and maintaining different familial roles. Though each

⁶⁸ DMW 96, 102, 112-113, 117-119, 125-126

character is vastly different in their opinions on womanhood and what they are going through, they converge on this point of negotiating contradictions and becoming more self-sufficient thereby. Secondly, each character maintains some kind of *a priori* structure that informs their actions. That is, that they are women, and which kind of female role within the family they maintain (mother, younger sister, older sister, aunt), shapes how they approach situations and with what end in mind they operate.

Thus, I take the inner form⁶⁹ to be both an (1) internal logic (a process of contradictions and resolutions, leading to a higher synthesis) and (2) *a priori* structure that shapes experiences. The former responds to socially constructed concepts of Woman, and the latter responds to Salomé's quasi-essentialist understanding of sex. Recall our discussion regarding Salomé's definition of Woman: there are biological elements that inform her nature as a mother and wife. And yet, there is also this returning to an Urgrund and reflexively establishing a whole self that belongs to the essence of Woman. I take this inner form to be properly realized when Woman engages with motherhood by entertaining both masculine and feminine drives in self-relational ways, again as evidenced in Section 2.3. When fully realized, this inner form properly enables Woman to engage in the constant negotiation of self as object (in relation to her external context) and subject (in relation to her inner state)—both of which she necessitates (following 1 above) (again, see Section 2.3). Likewise, the inner form refers to the less differentiated female structures that govern proper motherhood (following from 2 above)—this essentialist notion is offset by 1. This inner form, when realized, enables Woman to bring her various parts—which precede the whole—into a whole, complete entity. It is the locus of her wholeness of particularity.

This internal logic is in part derived from how Salomé describes Woman (See Section 2.4) and also from a “hidden rhythm, a rhythmic up-and-down [through which] [...] all her being and its expressions are harmoniously balanced” that constitutes the “inner being of woman.”⁷⁰ She operates not linearly but circularly. It “repeats itself once more in the narrowest, most physical sense” and is “what constitutes the inner being of woman on a large scale and on the whole.”⁷¹ This process of negotiation, returning to the Urgrund and back to herself is intimately connected with “homeliness” —something which Woman is biologically predisposed to experience. Recall the snail comparison. That Woman is her own home suggests that her inner being is a haven, and she is expected to share it with others who seek peace and quiet. But she can only do so if she has her home (her inner form) protected by freedoms. Woman may

⁶⁹ It occurs to me that there are a few presuppositions that one might want to address. It need not be all that clear as to why a whole self is necessary; or what her views are on not living out a full self. Though our discussion has shown that this whole self seems necessary for human flourishing, we might still find ourselves unsatisfied with what follows from this (i.e. *why presuppose the self needs to exist?*). Indeed, I have not mentioned love which, as Waithe (1987) points out, Salomé takes as necessary if one wants to get to know the self fully. For now, we will not put more pressure on this point: a whole self needs to exist, for reasons detailed in previous sections, and that suffices for now.

⁷⁰ DMW 114. And from Woman “can take on more contradictions and work through them, naturally, organically, within herself” (DMW 112).

⁷¹ DMW 114

overlook social norms and rules as she navigates her surroundings; existing barriers and societal expectations may become superficial or irrelevant over time. Woman may need to shed these social constructs to reveal her authentic self, mirroring the snail-shedding husks. Either way, from this form must follow a freedom to protect it.

We might wonder why this needs to be considered a “form.” Salomé, shortly after this snail metaphor, writes that Woman “develops her own style for everything that gives distinctive character to whatever she says or does, or to whatever she is surrounded by” when she develops “home.⁷²” This is to say that a complete and individual inner form—a kind of home—is her self, hence giving us the motivation to call it a form. There is something essentially teleological about it and something individualized. This might give “the impression of a strange mix between opposites in woman: The impression of the savage, impulsive, contradictory, and at the same time, of the harmonious, still, and balanced; the instinctive protest against law, classification, responsibility, duty, and certainly also the higher code of civilized behavior that never transgresses against itself.⁷³” As suspected, there is a constant negotiation: she must, as previously described, endlessly manage opposites— lawlessness and the imposition of societal norms. This inner form is meant to give structure to this: to essentially identify how it is that Woman handles the imposition of societal rules, her own biological nature, and her desires. She requires this constant negotiation—a constant “becoming broader” such that she does not get into conflict or perplexity.⁷⁴ In any case, the internal logic inherent in a Woman’s internal form requires freedoms to protect it.⁷⁵ Given this form, Woman is autonomous and self-conscious, and requires freedom to protect this.

4.2 Salomé’s Account of Internal Freedom

As previously suggested, Marianne could not actualize this inner form until she experienced freedom, as it were, that allowed her to do so. It was not until a conversation with her daughters and sister that Marianne realized she was regarding herself as an object— something that Dr. Tomasow inspired her to do. She was viewing herself only in service of

⁷² DMW 118-119

⁷³ DMW 118-119

⁷⁴ DMW 120

⁷⁵ A part of this inner being relates to “home” and “whole”: the whole is home (DMW 123-124). Salomé discusses an ancient dream in which Woman “was still everything in everything” (DMW 123-124). Here, we find further evidence for my claims thus far: she discusses the necessity of the whole, the tragedy that Man struggles, what woman gets through this constant negotiation, the *Urgrund*, and how self-assertion and self-sufficiency is important. For more on this, see: “[i]t is indeed as if the female egg cell possesses in it, in this self-enclosed aura, a natural home around herself; as if she had, so to speak, no longer taken part in the last steps out of herself and into the foreign, into the void, into the thousand vague possibilities of being and living outside; as if she were more directly connected to the all sustaining and endless whole, and therefore still more securely bound to the foundational *ur-soil*. However, that is precisely why—as it is already so elementarily and primitively suggested— there lies in the feminine, the more in-tact harmony, the more secure roundness, the greater temporary perfection and completeness dormant in itself. A self sufficiency and self-glory [*Selbstherrlichkeit*] are in this circle, in accordance with the deepest intentions of being, which would not let itself be combined with the restlessness” (DMW 97). And “what closes itself off and completes itself earlier culminates into a greater and more harmonious beauty precisely for this reason, and it realizes this beauty in every detail in the living context of the totality of its life” (DMW 97).

Sophie, which meant she was overlooking herself as her own end—something which both Cita and Aunt Otilie found harmful.

Thus, I take it that this inner form requires inner freedom. This refers to a Woman's capacity to view herself as (and operate within external relations as) a subject (the importance of which I described in Section 2.3). It is her capacity for engaging with reciprocal and reflexive relations within herself that, in turn, enables her to act in an autonomous and self-sufficient manner. It is a state of liberation wherein she can negotiate conflictual drives, the double direction of her narcissism, as well as her femininity and masculinity without sacrificing the boundlessness of desire or the drive toward self-definition. This is a freedom she pursues for its end, unlike external freedom, which, as we will see, is pursued for the end of motherhood. She must pursue herself not to be a good wife or mother but simply to be a whole self. This is characterized as not being determined by something outside you; it is the capacity for Woman to choose for herself independent of domination by or of others. Internal freedom, as such, guarantees autonomy to a significant extent.

4.3 Salomé's Account of External Freedom

Still, given this internal freedom, Marianne was not able to act within her role as a mother in a way that respected this inner form. It was not until she was free from Dr. Tomasow's coercion that she was able to be a self-sufficient woman and someone who depends on family and has family depend on her. Marianne was not able to simultaneously maintain being self-sufficient and being a mother—externalize her inner form—given coercive structures within dependency relations.

Thus, I take external freedom to be Woman's ability to act within external relations—motherhood or marriage, for instance—in ways that are free from compulsion by others: she can manage these relations (which are innate to her) on her terms. Recall from Section 2.3 what makes the best kind of mother and wife: a Woman who is free to choose, does not subsume herself under her husband's power, and can remain whole in her choice. This external freedom thus protects her inner freedom and creates her ability to externalize her inner form, thereby achieving wholeness and unity within herself and with an external context. This external freedom is not quite self-relational in the way the internal freedom is. This external freedom as protecting her inner freedom ensures that jobs or such activities are not the sole purpose of Woman and only how she becomes a comprehensive person⁷⁶. This external freedom is meant to structure dependency relations within marriage and motherhood.

Salomé offers us another helpful metaphor, this time illustrating the importance of this external freedom⁷⁷. Salomé introduces the idea that, according to the “ur-eternal laws of nature,”

⁷⁶ See Section 2.3 for a discussion about this

⁷⁷ “Whereas in his practical state of being human, he now and then descends into the state of being like a henchman or a tool. Perhaps, according to ur-eternal laws of nature, woman has grown into the fate of resembling a tree, whose fruits are not individually picked, separated, packaged and dispatched, and then are made subject to the most various purposes (DMW 110-111). But rather, she resembles a tree, which in the overall appearance of its blossoming,

a woman has grown into a fate resembling a tree. While people want to pick her fruits (or literally use her for offspring and reproduction), what she wants is, first and foremost, to exist and to do so in her beauty. She provides shade—and nurtures children—but longs to do so in her beautiful, autonomous state. When an external force, such as windfall, comes along or the fruit becomes too heavy, then the offspring will fall even when it is not ripe. These still, are noble and sweet because they were not artificially coerced to fall. Woman, as trees do, both produce their ‘fruit’ unintentionally. This ‘fruit’ can be enjoyed only when it falls naturally; artificially taking the ‘fruit’ for others to use suggests that the tree (or Woman) cannot live to its full potential and health. Woman needn’t conform to the world to carry out her role: naturally given processes need to obtain instead. As a tree does, Woman consumes her strength and juice within her own core of being. She does not need to provide evidence of her worth; instead, she should stretch her shade-giving branches to give rest and refreshment without worrying about external validation. There is this inner form that is nurturing and empowering, in other words, and external freedom must protect it. Without external freedom, the tree cannot naturally exist and flourish. If Woman must worry about external relations—without external freedom, in other words—then she cannot wholly provide her strength and life.

4.4 Salomé’s Complete, Gendered Self, connected to the Urgrund and Protected by Freedoms

Put this together, and we arrive at who Marianne is at the end of *Ma*; to arrive at a whole and complete self is to realize an inner form, achieved by inner freedom and protected by external freedom. At first, Ma solely depends on her family and lives for them. Through various discussions with Cita and Aunt Ottilie, two independent women, she begins to realize the harm in not living for herself. When Sophie approaches her with the proposal that she study abroad, Ma is left stranded: her sources of fulfillment are no longer immediately present. By the end, she becomes her own source of fulfillment while also being a mother. She learns to reconnect with herself and a greater collective. She becomes her own home and self-sufficient. Thus, her inner form—being a mother and also intimately connected with herself—is realized only when she pursues herself as her own end and as a subject: when inner freedom obtains. This, in turn, is only realized when she can act within her role as a mother—as being dependent and the one being depended upon—as autonomous and free from compulsion by Dr. Tomasow or other societal expectations: when external freedom is realized. Only then, with the freedoms in place,

ripening, shade-giving beauty, wishes simply to be there and appear in its beauty, unless new sprouts and new trees emerge from it. If, one day, a blowing wind shakes the treetops, or if a fruit falls down here and there due to its own weight, it may indeed not always be unripe, but rather often may be a noble and sweet indulgence, a refreshment for the passerby. But it is only windfall, effortlessly discarded and should wish to mean nothing more than that. I mean, in other words: As the manifestation of life, as the totality of life, woman consumes her strength and her juice within her own core of being. (DMW 110) [...] The definite certainty that she is not required to provide such evidence in order to feel the highest self empowerment in herself, that she only needs to stretch her shade-giving branches from herself, to give rest to the weary, that she needs to be there to provide refreshment for the thirsty, without worrying over how many of her fruits one could add up outside in the market” (DMW 111).

can her inner form continue to exist in a whole manner and negotiate constant drives and contradictions.

Our discussion of *Der Mensch als Weib* supports this conclusion. Exercising a woman's end—motherhood—supplies freedom, and only if those conditions of internal freedom, etc have been met. This amounts to the constant negotiation of fusing with externality and reverting internally: of dissolution and unification. One can only see this dualism if one sees the external whole—a sort of *Urgrund*—and desire to fuse with it⁷⁸. For woman seeks wholeness with *Urgrund* and wholeness with herself. It amounts to a way of individualizing a generic (perhaps biological) form of being; it allows Woman to develop and maintain a self-consciousness and not be reduced to Woman simpliciter. It is as if Salomé advocates for both gender essentialism—gender is a discrete and dichotomous social category biologically determined— and gender existentialism—individuals should have the freedom and autonomy to express their gender authentically, even if it diverges from societal norms or expectations. The existentialism derives from her inward focus on the self, while the essentialism focuses on the outer relations of dependency and embodiment.

I explained these terms in terms of Woman and womanhood. The general idea remains the same for Man or manhood: the equal necessity of an inner form, inner freedom, and external freedom. These might be defined slightly differently given that they are biologically differentiated and socially constructed as superior, but regardless the self remains constructed in similar ways. This follows from conversations in Section 2.4: though he can and is encouraged to pursue external goals—and this does, in fact, come naturally to him—he is not a 'whole' person. As mentioned, he misses the internal dimension that Woman naturally has, and that he would be better off having.

We might wonder whether, given this picture of freedom and inner form, Salomé argues for a gendered self or for gendered ways to get to a universal self. This is another way of asking: do internal and external freedom emancipate a self that happens to be gendered, or a gendered self.? How essential is it to this emancipation that it is a Woman, for instance, rather than a person (gender unidentified)? To begin answering these questions, we might want to return back to where we began: with "internal" and "external" concepts that Salomé rewrites given her understanding of essentialist qualities of the female and male sex that have (inappropriately) led to certain social conclusions. There are certain ideals that guide life: internalist and externalist ideals. Historically, one has been thought of as the female ideal and the other as the male ideal. According to Salomé, there is some truth to this insofar as a woman's biology reveals her to be naturally equipped for exercising the internal ideal, and a man's biology reveals him to be naturally equipped for exercising the external ideal (Section 2). Salomé makes clear, however, that we should not adopt this biological fact as instructive in a social sense. As it turns out (Sections 3 and 4), people need to fulfill both ideals, in order to be fully emancipated and whole

⁷⁸ She makes a similar point in Salomé, "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism", *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 31:1, 1-30

selves. It is a fact about the nature of man and woman that fulfilling both ideals would lead to such emancipation, and thus a normative claim that we ought to not confine each gender to their biologically inclined ideal. Woman can easily follow the ‘female ideal’ and are denied ‘male ideal’; this leads to problems discussed in previous sections. The opposite goes for Man. To my mind, Salomé intends for this to be a social fact of how they are treated, not an essential fact. And, in fact, within this claim we find a political critique: Woman have been forced to give up external freedom, and Man has been forced to give up internal freedom, and this is a problem. We might wonder where these ideals come from, whether it be the idealization of biological constraints or something more like Nietzschean genealogy. That is not the main claim at hand, however. Rather, this discussion of ideals suggests that there is some kind of universal self but, given a Woman’s and Man’s biology (that has been socialized in a certain way), there are gendered ways become in touch with their form (self), Urgrund, and find emancipation (internally and externally). As she writes, “Woman “can take on more contradictions and work through them, naturally, organically, within herself, whereas Man must first weed out these very contradictions theoretically before he can attain clarity in his own mind.”⁷⁹ There is a biological fact about how Woman and Man operate differently.⁸⁰ And yet a whole self will look the same for Man and Woman: one that works through constant negotiations internally and externally.

5. A Return to the Biologically Less Differentiated Woman: A Positive Affirmation of Life

We have arrived at a complete account of how the gendered self exists—the kind of freedoms it requires to flourish in the ways it should and is meant to. Indeed, Salomé offers an account of life (or the female way of life) from the inside rather than mechanistically from the outside. Our discussion reveals that, according to Salomé, the life of the mind is something living: the constant motion of progressing towards and retreating from an inner form; the constant negotiating, searching, and resistance to resolving⁸¹. Moreover, inner form and internal freedom affirm life in the face of constant negotiation, suffering, and confusion that the necessity of external freedom implies. As I see it, this is a key moment in Salomé philosophy where this picture of freedoms I have described so far becomes something normative, rather than only metaphysical: the life promoting ideals (inner and external freedom) imply a positive affirmation of life and thus suggest that we ought to see Woman and Man in the ways this freedom presupposes. We see this obtain in *Ma* when Marianne asks her children, “Are you really already making life into the ‘bad guy’ as the reason for everything? Are you really always in such a fearfully chilling and serious mood?” (*Ma* 8 (my translation)). This same theme of reaffirming life continues throughout the novel. That is the desire for overcoming resistance: returning to the

⁷⁹ DMW 112

⁸⁰ I suggest that she does not simply counter the ‘Man is superior to Woman’ view by stating that ‘Woman is superior to Man’: her view is far more nuanced than this initial appearance of her view.

⁸¹ She makes similar points in Salomé, Lou Andreas-. *Die Erotik. In Die Gesellschaft: Sammlung sozialpsychologischer Monographien*, vol. 23, edited by Martin Buber, 5-68. Frankfurt am Main: Literarische Anstalt: Rütten & Loennig, 1910; Salomé, Lou Andreas-. *Der Gott. Einzelbände*, vol. 5, edited by Hans-Rüdiger Schwab, 9-133. Taching am See: MedienEdition Welsch, 2016.

self and the Urgrund is to reaffirm life. It is not that the resistance is overcome: it is that one desires to continuously overcome resistance within dependency relations that are naturally a part of gender. There is a struggle, a becoming, the reaching of an end, the retreating of this end, and the reaching of the opposition of this end: a constant negotiation. This affirmation requires a reevaluation of the dominant values that negate Womanhood—values that Salomé reevaluates and rewrites. She shows that the struggle for Woman to assert herself is good for its own sake—for the ways she becomes closer with herself and the Urgrund. Salomé affirms life, in other words, with this picture of inner form, internal freedom, and external freedom. I propose that she, in that way, suggests we ought to view freedom as needing to address dependency and embodiment issues natural to gender.

6. Concluding Remarks

My aim has been to offer an account of Salomé's metaphysics of gender as put forth in *Der Mensch als Weib*, corroborate this account given characterization in *Ma* as an instantiation of her metaphysics of gender, and allow the relationship between the two texts to give us her philosophy of freedom. Moreover, my aim has been to systematize Salomé's account of freedom and explicate what the emancipation of Woman entails given this metaphysics of gender. I set the stage by situating the two works in question within the feminist and political debates of the time. This revealed ways in which Salomé was misunderstood and labeled an anti-feminist. According to my account, we should rethink the evidence used to label her an anti-feminist because it reveals a key concept within her philosophy: external and internal forces might be aligned with certain sexed, biological ideals, but they are not instructive of how the two sexes develop an emancipated self. With this in mind, I offered a detailed analysis of Salomé's account of Woman as well as diagnosis of Man and masculinity. This revealed that each sex has certain tendencies—the male sex is externally oriented, and the female sex is internally oriented—and that each sex can only cultivate a successful, whole self by embracing both masculine and feminine tendencies. In that way, sex, for Salomé, not only maintains biologically essential elements, but must also negotiate three dialectics: (a) Urgrund and Woman's inner, whole home; (b) Woman as self-sufficient and dependent; and (c) Woman as providing her own home and providing a home for others. This is meant to reveal that dependency relations are central to relationships between people—between men and women. I put forth the argument that rights, according to Salomé, are therefore not enough to emancipate Woman. The inner form of a person—a metaphysical account of their gendered self—requires external and internal freedom. According to Salomé, Woman's inner form—the “inner being of woman”⁸²—is both an (1) internal logic (a process of contradictions and resolutions, leading to a higher synthesis) and (2) *a priori* structure that shapes experiences. This requires inner freedom, that is a Woman's capacity to view herself as, and operate as a subject. It requires her capacity for engaging with reciprocal and reflexive relations within herself that, in turn, enable her to act in an autonomous and self-sufficient manner. Inner freedom creates a condition of emancipation wherein she can negotiate

⁸² DMW 114

various dialectics independent from domination or coercion by others. According to my account of Salomé's thought, external freedom is Woman's ability to act within external relations—motherhood or marriage, for instance—in ways that are free from compulsion by others. It protects her inner freedom and creates her ability to externalize her inner form, thereby achieving wholeness and unity within herself and with an external context. Finally, I suggested that inner form and internal freedom positively affirm life, and thus turn her account from a metaphysical to a normative one. There is certainly more work to be done on this front: there is more work to be done in understanding *Ma*, how and which Salomé's literary work⁸³ demonstrate her philosophy (therefore offering philosophical thought not captured in her strictly philosophical texts), and in what ways her account of freedom was inspired or influenced by the philosophers she studied and worked with. For now, I leave us with a final word from Salomé: "If some new ends for which one must surrender that which is most glorious on earth and hardest won, namely, freedom, then may I stay stuck in transition forever, for that I will not give up. Surely no one could be happier than I am now, for the gay fresh holy war likely about to break out does not frighten me: quite the contrary, let it break. We shall see whether the so-called "inviolable bounds" drawn by the world do not just about all prove to be innocuous chalk-lines."⁸⁴

⁸³ She has very interesting comments on aesthetic form. For instance: "So, too, we could imagine a literary technique (that old dream of mine) which would be true to that very unity of formation. It would concentrate its poetic creativity on just this, instead of on spatiotemporal representation Freud once remarked that it would take an artist to reconstruct a completed analysis in reverse, from the end to the beginning. The supremely individual stays back of itself, away from the typical, in which we recognize everything once more in its particular form, and so the great elemental themes that children love and legends create recur. Yes, even the fairy tale, the descendant of the legend, would become genuine and possible again, rather than mere 'imitation.'" Salomé, Lou Andreas-. trans. Stanley Leavy. *The Freud Journal of Lou Andreas-Salome*. New York: Basic Books, 1964 pp. 49-50.

⁸⁴ *Chance*, p. 162. For the German original, see Pfeiffer, *Dokumente*, p. 103.

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